tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-19038734753664642024-03-03T07:22:39.419-05:00Animal Ethicsjmarkshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18418276248125976522noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1903873475366464.post-42070972253622768762022-12-13T10:51:00.001-05:002022-12-22T08:59:15.051-05:00Touchstone: Animal Ethics and Desire’s Role in Ethics<p><span style="text-indent: 0in;">President Trump’s expressed
attitudes and actions towards immigrants revolt me, and viscerally offend my
deepest convictions abut American values. (As do many other of his attitudes
and actions.) Yet when I encounter someone else who shares my feelings about
Trump, I am brought back to my senses. For chances are very high that that
someone else who is so disgusted with Trump is a meat-eater, given that so few
people in this country are not, and furthermore feels little if any compunction
about it, or, even if she does, has no intention whatever of ceasing to eat
animals, not to mention diary, eggs, and honey. So I ask myself: How can moral
feelings be taken seriously, or at least at face value? For if someone outraged
by Trump’s behavior toward immigrants, or women, et al., can be relatively
indifferent to the (in)human treatment of other animals – which is vastly more
horrific to boot -- what does this say about the true basis of that outrage? Veganism
has become my moral touchstone.</span><span style="text-indent: 0in;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white;"><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">But am I making a coherent case? I seem to be
suggesting that morality itself is a questionable enterprise. But isn’t the
logical conclusion from what I have written only that some people wear moral
blinkers and fail to see their own shortcomings when focused intently on
others’? That is a com</span><span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">monplace of the moral
life: “</span><span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-color-alt: windowtext; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine
own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy
brother's eye</span><span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">” (Matthew 7:5, KJV). I
am sure I wear blinkers too and </span><span style="color: black; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">am relatively indifferent, or even partial, to various things that
other people are outraged by. This could be interpreted to mean only that I am
human oh so human like everybody else and cannot be expected to be morally
perfect, or comprehensively moral. That is not an indictment of morality as
such, is it? Nobody is perfectly rational or knowledgeable either, but don’t we
still value rationality and knowledge?</span> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white;"><span style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-color-alt: windowtext;">Furthermore,
do I not myself exhibit outrage at <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">both</i>
Trump’s behavior and that of omnivores? So how can I be asserting that morality
is not to be taken seriously?</span><span style="background-color: transparent;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">There is still something especially telling about the
failure to be vegetarian, not to mention vegan, which is, again, why I refer to
it as the moral touchstone. For, <span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">I am convinced, the human
(mis)treatment of other animals ranks as the greatest atrocity of all time in
terms of the sheer number of sentient begins who have been made to suffer and
have their lives cut short. So if the vast majority of humanity continues to
eat other animals, and shows no sign of ever stopping to do so, and without the
least moral compunction, then doesn’t this tell us something stunning about
morality itself? I think the relevant comparison to rationality and knowledge
would be if human beings embraced contradiction or continued to maintain that
the Earth is flat. If that were the case then I think there might be equal
reason to dismiss rationality and knowledge as not as important as they purport
to be in human affairs.</span> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">The knee-jerk response of most moralists to the proposal
that we therefore all just give up morality is that chaos would ensue because
every conceivable atrocity would suddenly become permissible. But, once again,
the ongoing Supreme Atrocity of animal agriculture, with not only moral
indifference but often even moral endorsement, quite undercuts that objection,
it seems to me. (I don’t even need to critique the conceptual confusion of
asserting that something would be permissible, which is itself a moralist
notion, if there were no morality.) I don’t see morality standing in the way of
atrocity. If anything, in fact, I see morality as abetting it. So this
objection is at a minimum a case of the pot calling the kettle black.</span> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Let me conclude, in light of the discussion above prompted
by reflection on Trump and omnivores, by offering a way to think about what is
really going on with morality and ethics. I see the bottom line as desire. This
is so in two ways. First is that the world would continue to spin merrily
around if we got rid of morality because we would still have our desires. Trump
would continue to disparage immigrants and others because he – correctly it
appears! – sees this as a way (and perhaps the only way) to fulfil his desire
to be and remain President. Most human beings would continue to eat other
animals because they desire to experience the tastes they are used to and may
even be hard-wired to enjoy. I would (and do, even since forswearing morality)
continue to donate money to the ACLU to fight Trump’s policies and continue to
eat only plants and urge others to do so because I desire to live in a country
that embodies the message of the Statue of Liberty and to prevent other animals
from needless suffering and premature death at human hands, resp.</span> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">The second way desire enters the picture, on my view, is
that morality is itself a manifestation of desire. Thus, Trump no doubt
believes he is a paragon of virtue who is forever doing the (morally) right
thing, and sees his opponents as evil. And most human beings believe they are,
at a minimum, doing nothing (morally) wrong by continuing to eat meat even if
they don’t need it for nutrition and might even be healthier if they didn’t eat
it. And people who oppose Trump’s policies and actions and animal agriculture
believe that those things are (morally) wrong and their “perpetrators” probably
evil to boot. But in all of these cases, it seems to me, it is the desires
mentioned in the preceding paragraph that are calling the shots. Morality is
window dressing.<a href="file:///C:/Users/joelh/OneDrive/Documents/WRITING%20by%20me/BLOG/Blog%20AMORALITY/PART%201%20MORALISM/Touchstone.docx#_edn1" name="_ednref1" style="mso-endnote-id: edn1;" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[1]</span></span></span></span></a></span> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Normally we believe, or unthinkingly assume, that we desire
certain things because we think they are good or bad or right or wrong etc.
Thus, originally I thought my reason for wanting to end animal agriculture was
that (I thought) it was bad or was wrong. But now I think the real reason was (and
is) that I just can’t stand the thought of animals suffering and dying in that
way and want it to stop. But, similarly, people who do not need to but
nevertheless continue blithely to eat other animals, do so, not because they
think it’s morally kosher to eat meat, but, for the most part, because they
want to continue to indulge in the pleasures of eating it (or they want to stay
healthy or vigorous and mistakenly believe they need to eat meat for that purpose,
etc.).</span> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Morality, then, is superfluous – an add-on to desire. This
at the very least (if true) buttresses my case for just giving up morality, by
undercutting the moralist’s argument that only morality stands in the way of
chaos.</span> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">However, if morality were merely superfluous, it is hard to
understand how it could have become so prominent in human affairs. If we accept
a Darwinian view of the prevalence of traits. must not morality somehow serve
important human purposes? My answer is: yes and no. No doubt morality has
performed an essential function in preserving our species through the ages. It
may have done so by pumping up our desires with a seemingly objective
imprimatur (usually also reinforced by divine sanction), thereby giving us a
motivational advantage over other proto-humans who lacked such a notion. But
this is not an argument for our wanting to keep morality around today. Why not?
Because the environment in which morality helped us to thrive has changed
drastically … and in part even due to morality’s effectiveness. Our very
evolutionary success now has us outstripping the carrying capacity of the
planet. So what may have made us the dominant creatures we are today could now
be paving the way for our extinction … and replacement by another species that
lacks the moral embellishment of their desires …unless we ourselves can
transform into <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Homo amoralist</i>.</span> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">Mutatis mutandis</span></i><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> for meat eating. The flesh and
products of other animals may have helped to sustain us in the past. But today
both our ever increasing numbers and our ever more powerful technologies conspire
to clog our arteries and exhaust the world’s resources and even contribute to climate change. Meat eating may now
have reached the tipping point of militating <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">against</i> our continued thriving and even survival. And so also for
xenophobia and the like. At one time each human tribe had to defend against
every other tribe. Today this is a recipe for societal breakdown and even the
end of civilization.<a href="file:///C:/Users/joelh/OneDrive/Documents/WRITING%20by%20me/BLOG/Blog%20AMORALITY/PART%201%20MORALISM/Touchstone.docx#_edn2" name="_ednref2" style="mso-endnote-id: edn2;" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Morality
just makes these entrenched behaviors and attitudes all the more resistant to
modification. It is therefore the straw that could break the back of human
existence.</span><span style="text-indent: 0in;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">There are actually two ways that animal ethics (though
certainly not alone in this regard) explodes morality. The first is that
morality has gone blithely along all these millennia without doing the animals
a damn bit of good … if anything, only reinforcing their exploitation. The
second is that even when morality <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">does</i>
attribute “moral considerability” to other animals, “weakness of will” usually
comes to the rescue of human prerogatives. “I know it’s wrong but ….” So the complementary
flaws of morality are well in evidence:</span><span style="text-indent: 0in;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0in;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">1) If we have a strong desire
for something that morality seems, or can be made to seem, to endorse, invoking
morality pumps up this subjective phenomenon with a false objectivity to the
status of command, demand, injunction, sanction, imperative, obligation,
prohibition ….</span><span style="text-indent: 0in;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0in;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">2) If we have a strong desire
for something that morality seems to oppose (despite our casuistic efforts),
invoking weakness of will reveals the (relative) weakness of our etiolated and
really contentless desire to “do the right thing.”</span><span style="text-indent: 0in;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">This suggests that the apparent strength of our desire to do
the right thing is (usually?) an illusion of misplacement, for it only reflects
the strength of a coincident nonmoral desire. Thus, when we strongly want to do
what morality demands (or can be made to seem to demand), then we display a
strong desire to do the right thing; but when we strongly want to do what
morality prohibits (and cannot make it seem permissible), then we manifest only
a weak desire to do the right thing. In fact the moral desire as such is weak
all along but takes on (or seems to take on) the strength of any coincident
nonmoral desire.</span><span style="text-indent: 0in;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">One practical implication for moral abolitionism, then, is
that the motivational cost of giving up morality would be low, since strong
nonmoral desire will generally prevail in any case. However there is still an
asymmetry that makes a difference: For while an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">opposing</i> moral desire will hardly inhibit a strong nonmoral desire,
a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">coincident</i> moral desire will
exaggerate a strong nonmoral desire. To me this suggests that there is a motivational
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">benefit</i> to giving up morality, precisely
by <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">denying</i> our desires <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">excessive</i> strength (meaning, beyond what
reason supports).</span><span style="text-indent: 0in;"> </span></p><div style="mso-element: endnote-list;">
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<!--[endif]-->
<div id="edn1" style="mso-element: endnote;">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0in;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/joelh/OneDrive/Documents/WRITING%20by%20me/BLOG/Blog%20AMORALITY/PART%201%20MORALISM/Touchstone.docx#_ednref1" name="_edn1" style="mso-endnote-id: edn1;" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"> </span>Cf. Zimmerman (1962).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div id="edn2" style="mso-element: endnote;">
<p class="MsoEndnoteText" style="text-indent: 0in;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/joelh/OneDrive/Documents/WRITING%20by%20me/BLOG/Blog%20AMORALITY/PART%201%20MORALISM/Touchstone.docx#_ednref2" name="_edn2" style="mso-endnote-id: edn2;" title=""><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoEndnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">But so also for veganism and the
Golden Rule and amoralism? At some point, it seems, I do have to be claiming
that the views <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">I</i> favor and hold are,
as a matter of objective fact and not just “taste,” more benign to human
prospects. Of course I can still insist that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">caring about</i> human prospects is itself a “subjective choice.”</span></span><o:p></o:p></p><p class="MsoEndnoteText" style="text-indent: 0in;"><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0in;">Zimmerman, M. 1962. “The ‘Is-Ought’: An Unnecessary Dualism.” <i>Mind</i>, New Series 71 (281): 53-61. <span style="color: blue;">http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251730</span></p>
</div>
</div>jmarkshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18418276248125976522noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1903873475366464.post-63886709733756315052016-02-01T09:00:00.001-05:002020-10-30T13:02:06.552-04:00Intrinsic Desire and Morality: Entomological Revelations<p> Darwinism is all the rage among contemporary ethicists, and with good reason. Since no informed thinker can deny the centrality of natural selection to our development as the human beings we are, our values, like any of our other traits, must conform to the constraint of survival. In other words, however much we are by nature wedded to notions like justice and beauty and reason and curiosity and charity, the root cause must have to do with their furtherance of, or at least compatibility with, our survival under the conditions of our evolution on this planet. Yet on the face of it, our values often appear indifferent to and even in conflict with our survival. How could this be? What, after all, has rapture by a sunset, or the fervor to understand what happened before the Big Bang, or abhorrence at cruelty to other animals, etc. ad inf., to do with our individual or even collective advantage in the struggle for existence?</p><div class="MsoNormal"><o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Much ingenious thought has gone into addressing this question, particularly as regards altruism. For example, imagine A, who has some “altruism genes,” competing in the game of survival with E, who is a thoroughgoing egoist with only “egoism genes.” E would appear to have the advantage, since he will do whatever it takes to survive, whereas A would, on some occasions, sacrifice herself for others; so that we might expect E to survive and A to perish, and hence the trait of altruism itself to disappear from the population. But consider that if A’s altruism were directed toward her offspring, then A’s very self-sacrifice could assure the survival of her genetic trait of altruism in the next generation, and so on in the same manner into the indefinitely far future; whereas E’s uninhibited selfishness might inhibit the survival of his offspring, thereby bringing about the demise of that trait in short order. Thus, what at first might appear to be a paradox turns out to follow from the simple logic of natural selection.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">Noticing a spider by my kitchen sink the other day led me to consider the question of “paradoxical traits” more broadly. The tiny creature huddled in the dark, presumably patiently awaiting his or her prey. The thought struck me: “This spider is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> thinking, ‘I had best huddle in the dark, the better to obtain food’.” Then followed a long train of other thoughts (in me, not the spider). First was that many people would infer from this initial observation that the spider – and by extension all other nonhuman animals – is a mere mechanism; that is, that instead of reasoning to a conclusion about how to behave, the spider merely acts by instinct.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>But I came to a different conclusion about the spider’s mental life, indeed, the opposite conclusion. To me it seemed obvious that the spider, while certainly not reasoning to a conclusion, nevertheless was acting on the basis of a rich mental life, and in fact one similar to ours. For I suddenly appreciated that the spider was probably responding to the darkness with what, in the human case, we would call a preference or a desire. That spider likes the darkness. What that spider feels is the welcoming pleasure of basking in shade, perhaps in much the way you and I would take pleasure in finding shelter on a sweltering sunny day in the tropics. There is nothing fundamentally alien about the spider’s experience. There is no impassable gap between us, no deep mystery about “what it is like” to be a different sort of creature from ourselves.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Nor, therefore, is there any need to “anthropomorphize” in order to empathize with him or her (if it is sexed); we need only zoomorphize, so to speak, since surely all animals – now using “animals” to include humans – share one or another of many mental traits and not only physical traits.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Thus, neither do <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">we</i> “reason to a conclusion” when seeking shade in the normal run of cases. Yes, we might do so in special circumstances, or when needing to be reminded of the obvious because we have been distracted, etc. But for the most part, if we find the sun too hot, or if we wish to hide from a pursuer, or from the pursued, and so on, we will seek the darkness as a matter of course. Say “instinctively,” if you like, thereby bringing us “down” to the “level” of other animals; or say instead, and as I prefer to do, that all animals, human or otherwise, usually act on the basis of desire.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>But there is much more to say about this, even in my “desire” terms. Of particular note is that the desires that characterize us as animals are <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intrinsic</i> ones (what I called “desire<sub>1</sub>” in the previous section). An intrinsic desire is a desire to do something “for its own sake.” This is to be distinguished, in the first instance, from an extrinsic or instrumental desire (desire<sub>2</sub>), which is a desire to do something for some further reason or “ulterior motive.” So, as illustrated in the previous section, if you wanted to go for a walk in order to lose weight, and only for that reason, since otherwise you are averse to any kind of exercise (which is how you became overweight), then your desire to go for a walk would be merely instrumental. But if you desired to go for a walk simply for the pleasure of stretching your legs and seeing the sights on a beautiful day, then your desire to go for a walk would be intrinsic. (Of course a desire could also be both.)<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>So that little spider, as I see him, has an intrinsic desire to huddle in darkness … just as you and I have an intrinsic desire to huddle by a fire on a cold day. Now there are several things to note about this. First is that these desires could be construed as serving instrumental purposes. Thus, the spider is huddling in order not to starve, and you and I are huddling in order not to freeze. As suggested at the outset, the common denominator here is survival. So intrinsic desire would seem to have a function that makes sense in evolutionary terms.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Nevertheless, my main point is that these desires are intrinsic for all that, at least in the normal run of cases, since it is usually not necessary to, and could be positively maladaptive to have to, make an explicit inference from end to means in order to have these desires in the relevant circumstances. Our experience, therefore, is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i>, “I am cold; <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">therefore</i> I should huddle by this fire,” but is rather, “Oh, there’s a fire. Umm, warmth feels good.” So in this respect, to this degree, we are no different from the spider, who does not reason that s/he needs to huddle in the darkness, but only feels drawn to the darkness and satisfied to be in it.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>What has this to do with (so-called) paradoxical traits? It seems to me that many if not all of our intrinsic desires veer away from our evolutionary concerns, and in so doing carve out the special domain of the ethical. I have already suggested that there is no genuine paradox here, since explanatory hypotheses are available to bridge the gap between evolution’s demands and the sometimes seemingly opposed desires we have. Nature moves us by indirection; nature speaks to us through feelings. Feelings are our common denominator as animals, which we tendentiously call “instincts” in other animals and “reasons” in ourselves. But in fact both the spider and we are moved by the desire to get out of the heat or light and into the shade by nature’s mechanism for protecting us from predators or our skin from radiation or for feeding us, etc.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">What I want now to emphasize beyond this is the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">centrality</i> of intrinsic desire to ethics. This is a matter of interest and importance, I shall argue, because ethics is usually conceived to be about a different phenomenon that is easily confused with intrinsic desire. This other phenomenon is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">inherent value</i>. Inherent value is most directly confused with what we could call <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intrinsic value</i>, after the intrinsic <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">desire</i> that gives rise to it. Thus, if you desired to go for a walk for its own sake, then your <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">desire</i> would be intrinsic and so therefore would be the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">value</i> you attributed to what you desired – walking would have intrinsic value for you. Now suppose you were a real walking enthusiast, who wanted to spread the gospel of walking to all and sundry. Then a subtle shift might occur in your conception of walking’s value, from something you valued subjectively to something that possessed <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">objective</i> value. That latter is what I am calling inherent value.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>My main contention is that this mental move from subjective to objective is a mistake, and one with enormous, and largely baneful consequences. I don’t mean just about walking, of course, but in ethics generally.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> I take ethics to be reflection on how to live<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> (with more particular foci on actions, motives, traits, lifestyles, character, and so forth). But ethics, as I noted in the Introduction, is often more narrowly defined as the study of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">morality</i>. And there’s the rub. For morality, at least on a common understanding, is a domain of inherent values. It is in morality that we hear about things that we “must” or “should” or “ought to” do (etc.) <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">tout court</i> or <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">unconditionally</i> or <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">categorically</i>, which is to say, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> because we happen to desire to do them, since desire is a merely psychological or subjective phenomenon, but because they have objective value, or, in a teleological ethics, because they bring about something that has objective value. The term “inherent” is applicable in that it conveys the idea that the value <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">sticks to</i> the activity (or object or state of affairs) in question, whether it be walking or truth telling or whatever. We also say that inherent value is “absolute,” whereas intrinsic value is only “relative” (to one’s desires); so an action with inherent value is required of us, regardless of our desiring to do it or not to do it. An action with inherent value is our <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">duty </i>or<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> obligation</i> to perform; similarly, an action with negative inherent value is prohibited to us, even if we have a strong desire to carry it out (<span style="background: white; color: black;">Thou shalt not commit adultery<em>).</em></span><em><span style="background: white; font-style: normal; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;"><o:p></o:p></span></em></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal"><em> </em><em><span style="background: white; color: black; font-style: normal;">Inherent value, according to its proponents, can “stick to” many different types of things. Correspondingly, there are also many species of inherent value. Thus, not only can actions like walking or truth telling be objectively required or right to do</span></em><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><i><span style="background: white; color: black;"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: black; font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[7]</span></b></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></i></span></a><em><span style="background: white; color: black; font-style: normal;"> (and actions like lying and killing objectively forbidden or wrong), but also various character traits can be objectively good (or bad), which we call virtues (or vices), and various states of affairs can be objectively good (or bad), such as that peace prevails, and persons can be objectively good (or evil), and various scenes or human artifacts can be objectively beautiful (or ugly), and various verbal or behavioral routines can be objectively funny (or unamusing or offensive), and various physical conditions and exudations etc. can be objectively disgusting (or attractive), and so on.</span><span style="background: white; color: black;"> </span></em>By contrast, an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intrinsic</i> value is an illusion<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> insofar as it seems to inhere</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">in</i> an object, for it is really only a “projection” of subjective value into the object … analogous to the way we “project” a color sensation that arises in our brain into some object, like a red apple.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">A red apple <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">is</i> objectively red <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">in the sense that</i> it reflects light from its surface in such a way that, under specific conditions, various nerves in our retinas and optic nerves and cerebral cortices fire in such a way that we experience the sensation of red. But that sensation is in our brain, not on the apple’s skin, and hence is only subjective.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Someone else might experience the redness of the apple differently. Indeed, I have noticed that I myself experience its redness differently under different lighting conditions, and even with my two eyes severally. Just so, on the inherentist’s account, someone may, say, intrinsically disvalue Beethoven’s music, and this disvaluing would be a real phenomenon in his or her brain induced by sound waves from a performance or a recording that excite various nerves; but to project that disvaluing into the music itself and thereby attribute <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">inherent</i> negative value to it would be a mistake, since Beethoven’s music is objectively of the highest quality. It has objective value because the value is in the object of our regard (in this case, Beethoven’s music), not merely in our subjective experience of that object (our enjoyment or displeasure at listening to Beethoven’s music).<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">I accept the above as an analysis of the contrasting concepts of intrinsic and inherent value. However, I believe that only intrinsic value exists in reality.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> This is certainly a ground-shaking<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> thought,<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> and I cannot claim to be fully reconciled to it. Yet it does very definitely seem now to me to be true. As much as I myself love Beethoven’s music and, when in its grip, am filled with the sense that the music itself contains objective worth to the highest degree, I must, in a cooler moment, utterly reject that valuation. This has definite practical consequences. For while I would still take pains to attend a nearby concert of Beethoven’s music, since I love to listen to a good performance of it, I would no longer lift my nose in contempt for the person who vastly prefers listening to Mantovani. <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">De gustibus non est disputandum</i>.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">Of course that motto is a harder sell when it comes to morality.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[13]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> It is one thing to suppress one’s disdain for lowbrows, quite another to suppress one’s outrage at atrocities. Or so it seems. Alas, I have become more sensitive to the similarities than the differences. When I experience rage at the person who cuts me off on the highway, or despisal at the Volkswagen company for deliberately deceiving the public and the government about the emissions from its diesel vehicles, or contempt for people who continue to eat animals despite their growing awareness of complicity in needless cruelty and slaughter, I am now keenly aware of the anger that fuels these feelings<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn14;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[14]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> – anger that has its own source of being apart from what is eliciting it (maybe my general frustration with life’s recalcitrance to my deepest desires), and that will often make the situation even worse. I therefore consciously strive to dissolve the feelings by directing my thoughts toward countervailing ideas and desires; specifically, I remind myself that right and wrong are myths, that the people with whom I am angry could not have done otherwise than they did, and that “everyone you meet is fighting a hard battle” (Ian Maclaren if not Philo).<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn15;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[15]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">By the same token, I feel less need to suppress the tendency to objectify colors, and the beauty of Beethoven’s music, and other nonmoral phenomena, since the effects of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">these</i> projections are less baneful and may even be net beneficial.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">What this still leaves me with are intrinsic wishes and desires: that drivers use caution, that companies behave honestly, that human animals refrain from eating all animals.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn16;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[16]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> I deeply care about and desire all of these things, which motivates me to various actions. But sans the phony patina of morality that layers objective disvalue atop reckless driving and drivers, dishonest companies, and carnivorous habits and persons, my actions can be focused on effectiveness, rationality, universal charity and goodwill, and other ends and values that I intrinsically like, rather than on venting, retaliating, preaching, punishing, and so forth, which I dislike both intrinsically and instrumentally (that is, because they are things I dislike in themselves and also lead to other things I dislike in themselves or are simply less effective in bringing about what I do like).<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn17;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[17]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> This, then, is why I deem intrinsic desire and intrinsic value to be the very soul of ethics (and of valuing things generally), and reject the standard interpretation of ethics (and axiology) that places value “<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">in</i>” things (including actions, motives, character traits, sentient beings, artifacts, etc.). Value is therefore (and in this sense) subjective, not objective.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn18;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[18]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> And this has various interesting and important ramifications.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn19;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[19]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> As I noted at the outset, one is that we are much more firmly situated in the animal realm than we are used to suppose, for all animal species, including our own, appear to be guided by intrinsic desire above all.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">But are not human beings superior in that we can override desires by force of reason? So sometimes we act for the same kind of reasons, or really feelings, as the spider does, but are we not also capable of a kind of action, based on <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">reasoning</i>, that is absolutely unavailable to the spider? Many have drawn this implication from the behavior of another insect, the sphex wasp. Scientists performed a simple and clever experiment to debunk this creature’s cognitive aspirations.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn20;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[20]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> The wasp’s typical way of feeding her young is to bring back a cricket for them to eat in the burrow where they are incubating. Just prior to dragging the carcass into the burrow, however, the wasp enters to make an inspection, apparently with intelligent intent to make sure everything is OK. What the scientists did was pull the cricket a few inches away from the burrow entrance while the wasp was inside. When the wasp emerged, what did mama do? She dragged the carcass back to the entrance <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">and then did another inspection</i>. The scientists pulled the cricket away again. The wasp emerged again, dragged the carcass back again, and did another inspection. This was repeated 40 times before the scientists felt they had made their point: The sphex wasp is not an intelligent being but only a programmed robot, not a conscious being but only a mechanism.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">But I find both that conclusion and its supposed implication to be highly questionable. The conclusion is questionable because it makes the same leap of interpretation I criticized in the case of my spider: There is no need to deny consciousness to a being just because it does not employ reasoning to decide how to behave. My spider probably acts on the basis of feeling, just as we usually do; and so too, I would imagine, the sphex wasp. The scientists merely debunked their own unwarranted attribution of reasoning to the wasp; there was no reason or need in the first place to assume that the wasp must <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">figure out </i>whether to inspect the burrow before bringing food to her young, any more than there is reason or need for a human parent to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">infer</i> that she or he should check on the baby every few minutes. In the normal run of cases one simply <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">feels</i> the urge to do so and acts accordingly.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">But, saith the scientists, that is “the normal run of cases”; the point at issue is whether human beings have the unique capacity to override feeling by means of reasoning. To this I reply that the scientists have quite unwarrantedly assumed that reasoning really does make a difference with human beings. I have two reasons for doubting this, if not absolutely, at least in the main. One is that human behavior is often (and I believe typically) just as absurdly repetitive as the wasp’s in the experiment.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn21;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[21]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> The other is that this can take place in the presence of abundant reasoning.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn22;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[22]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">I need only cite an example from my own life to make these points, since I am sure that my reader can readily identify with the phenomenon or recognize it in others. I have had an intermittent relationship with the same woman for the last ten years.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn23;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[23]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> We have often considered getting married. But the “intermittence” is due to frequent fallings-out over seemingly minor matters. From my point of view the problem has arisen, first, from her odd failure to observe certain verbal customs, such as saying (or writing in an email) “Thank you” when I have done something nice for her. But of course this only rises to the status of a “problem” when I react in a certain way. And react I often do, since, for reasons or causes ultimately unknown to me or anyone, I become very irritated after a string of such occasions and finally express that irritation.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">Naturally this has a negative effect on her in turn, who apparently sees no justification for my irritation. Perhaps she saw no need to say “Thank you” in the first place. Although of course she and I have discussed these things many times, I am still unable to speak definitively on her behalf; so I will speculate about her thoughts and feelings. She may not feel appreciation for me because she has expectations of my doing certain things for her as a matter of course; indeed, there would only be cause for <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">criticism</i> if I <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">failed</i> to do them, but there is no place for praise or gratitude if I do them.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn24;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[24]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Or she may in fact feel appreciation for the things I do for her – after all, why else stay with me all these years, despite our problems? But therefore she sees no reason to have to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">verbally express</i> that appreciation on every occasion. Am I so dense as not to recognize it? Thus, in either case, my expressions of irritation, not to mention the irritation itself, are, from her point of view, entirely gratuitous. So to her they appear mean-spirited, even cruel. And she, being, in her words, a “very sensitive” person, is deeply hurt by them.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">To me this is of course “absurd.” I too am a very sensitive person … obviously! That’s why supposedly little things like her not saying “Thank you” are so distressing to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">me</i>. Can she not at the very least acknowledge that we are alike in this regard: that our respective hurts are due to our equally sensitive natures, albeit with respect to different things? Maybe she can, or maybe she can’t. But the bottom line is that neither of us, despite our insights into ourself and the other, has proved capable of altering our response one iota in all these years. She simply cannot assure reliable verbal expression of her appreciation for the things I do for her, and I simply cannot reliably <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">refrain</i> from expressing my irritation at her failures to verbally express appreciation. Meanwhile, she simply cannot cease to feel distressed by my verbal expressions of irritation, no more than I can cease to feel irritated by her failures to verbally express her appreciation.<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>And the result has certainly been disastrous,<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn25;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[25]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> since we both deeply desire marriage, but it is clear that will never happen. Obviously, however – to complete my argument – we are both doing a lot of reasoning about the situation. This does not help. Indeed, I can say about myself, and I don’t doubt it is similarly true for her, that on occasion it is the reasoning itself that leads to the offending behavior: I reason to the conclusion that I must speak to her harshly about her inconsiderateness!<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn26;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[26]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> But just as often it is the opposite: I see abundant reason for <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> expressing, perhaps even not feeling, irritation – because it is not warranted by the facts and/or it will only have negative effects. But to no avail: The irritation arises, and I express it.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn27;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[27]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a><b><o:p></o:p></b></div><div class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in;">Therefore when I consider the sphex wasp, I think: <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">C’est moi</i>. And I can only (scornfully) laugh at the scientists who conclude, on the basis of their experiment, that the wasp is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">therefore</i> different from us, when in fact they have at least as much reason to conclude that we are the same as that wasp. If only the scientists were as reflective about the human condition as they have been clever in testing the wasp, they would not, after the 40<sup>th</sup> trial, have dismissed the wasp as inferior, but instead have felt a shock of recognition: “It’s just like us!”<a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn28;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;">[28]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> But of course the scientists are human oh so human, and <span style="background: white; color: black;">behold the mote in their fellow animal's eye without considering the beam in their own eye.<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><o:p></o:p></b></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white;"><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: black;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Thus my case for our commonality with other animals due to the preponderant reliance of behavior on intrinsic desire rather than reasoning. I have presented this as part of my case for the mythicality of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">inherent value</i>, and, all the more, its phony and even baneful role in ethics (and axiology more generally). </span><span style="color: black; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">An ethics of desire is not only more naturalistically plausible than an ethics of <i>inherent</i> (absolute, objective, categorical) value but can also explain why we value <i>intrinsically</i> things that are not on their face concerned with survival. </span><span style="background-attachment: initial; background-clip: initial; background-image: initial; background-origin: initial; background-position: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-size: initial; color: black;">In ethics it has been specifically <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">morality</i> that is premised on inherent value. This has been manifest in two main and opposing ways. One is the utilitarian or consequentialist morality, according to which we are all absolutely obligated to maximize (or at least to try to maximize) the amount of inherent good in the world. The other is the deontic or nonconsequentialist morality, according to which we are all absolutely obligated to do whatever is inherently right. Neither has any reality apart from its basis in desire, but both cause great mischief for making us think they do. Hence my recommendation to ditch morality altogether.<o:p></o:p></span></div><div class="MsoNormal"><br /></div><div style="mso-element: footnote-list;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><i style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, tahoma, helvetica, freesans, sans-serif; font-weight: 700;"><span style="font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-weight: normal;">Joel Marks is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of New Haven and a Bioethics Center Scholar at Yale University. This essay is excerpted from his book <u><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hard-Atheism-Ethics-Desire-Alternative/dp/3319437984/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1479311396&sr=1-1&keywords=hard+atheism"><span style="color: #888888;">H</span>ard Atheism and the Ethics of Desire</a></u> (Palgrave Macmillan 2016</span></i><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "times" , "times new roman" , serif; font-weight: 700;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><i>, pp. 97-109).</i></span></span><br /><hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><!--[endif]--><br /><div id="ftn1" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> The mechanism or mechanisms that assure the persistence of altruism in the human population are complex and even controversial; indeed, the very nature of altruism is contested. For a state-of-the-art treatment of the issues, see Wilson (2015). My example is only for illustrative purposes, to show the theoretical possibility of accounting for altruism in the seemingly selfish world of natural selection.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn2" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> As Thomas Nagel (1974) famously held there <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">was</i>.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn3" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> I am using “evolution” here as synonymous with natural selection, but natural selection is only one actual, not to mention possible, mechanism of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">evolution</i> in the broad sense of undergoing change. The equivocation seems warranted by natural selection’s prevalence in our current understanding of the evolution of animals. But see <span class="author"><span style="background: white; color: black;">Fodor</span></span><span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="background: white; color: black;"> and </span></span><span class="author"><span style="background: white; color: black;">Piattelli-Palmarini (2010)</span></span> for a (contested) corrective.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn4" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> It then becomes possible for “intelligent” creatures like ourselves to exploit these feelings for contra-survival purposes. Witness <span style="color: black; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">blocking reproduction with contraceptives while having sex solely for pleasure, courting heart disease by gorging on salty snacks, and growing obese from eating too many highly sweetened desserts (although any or all of these could also promote our <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">species’</i> survival prospects in an overpopulated world).</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn5" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> And most generally, in axiology, the domain or study of value as such. Thus, axiology encompasses not only ethics but also, for example, aesthetics, which is another value domain where subjectivity is commonly mistaken for objectivity (“I love Beethoven’s 5<sup>th</sup> Symphony” becomes “Beethoven’s 5<sup>th</sup> Symphony is magnificent”).<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn6" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> And also the fruit of that reflection.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn7" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> The value of walking “for its own sake” is perhaps more naturally styled as “good” rather than “right” since we experience it more as an enjoyment than as a duty. Walking could, however, be styled as a duty or as objectively required in the instrumental sense, when its value is derived from some further good, such as health.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn8" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> The situation could also be characterized as an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">interaction</i> between an organism of a certain type, in a certain state or under certain conditions, and an object (or surface) of a certain type, in a certain state or under certain conditions. But I still think it would make sense to characterize the value as a projection, which <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">results from </i>the interaction.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn9" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> “Subjective” in the sense of belonging to the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">subject</i> of the experience, that is, the one who is experiencing the red color sensation – the experiencer. It is of course an objective fact of the world that the sensation exists (although its nature is problematic).<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn10" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Note that I am <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> (necessarily) rejecting all inherent <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">qualities</i>, but only all inherent <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">values</i>. The former is a metaphysical notion, not an axiological one. Thus, for example, human beings may be inherently belligerent (under certain circumstances); I only reject that belligerence is inherently <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">bad</i> or <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">good</i>, or <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">right</i> or <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">wrong</i>. Of course many of us <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">intrinsically</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">dislike</i> belligerence, but that is a different matter (this being my main point) – and it would still be a different matter even if we <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">universally</i>, i.e., all human beings, disliked it (you could then even say: even if human beings were <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">inherently</i> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">averse</i> to belligerence). For that would still be a fact about our nature and not a fact about the nature of belligerence.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn11" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> And grounds-shaking, to coin a term, in that it removes certain considerations as legitimate grounds for drawing rational conclusions about how to live.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn12" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> It is comparable to losing one’s belief in God. Indeed, objectivity is the secular version of God, since for most nonbelievers (in God) it is the metaphysical source of value in the world.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn13" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[13]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> In fact it is potentially a hard sell in any value realm. Consider: “How can you eat gefilte fish? It’s disgusting!” For someone who feels that way, it is almost impossible to conceive that the disgustingness of gefilte fish is entirely relative to the individual. Indeed, this phenomenon can arise outside the realm of values and in the realm of facts. Consider: “How can you go around wearing shorts? It’s cold!” The person who says this simply cannot fathom how her experience of feeling cold could be only a subjective fact about herself rather than an objective fact about the temperature. Of course we could <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">define</i> “cold” to mean, say, 50 degrees Fahrenheit or lower; but this would only shift the speaker’s pseudo-objectivity to the question of whether one is rationally or prudentially permitted to dress lightly when it’s cold.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn14" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn14;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[14]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> The objectifying impulse is so strong that one can experience not only disapproval of someone else’s action, etc., but even incredulity. “I simply cannot believe that they would cut somebody’s head off.” “I simply cannot believe that they would skin an animal alive.” This is the power of desire. It is the same force at work when a highly aroused male simply cannot believe that the person he desires is not also turned on. The result may be rape. Objectification is dangerous. It is like a weapon, which can be employed for benign purposes but has a great potential for havoc and must always be handled with care; and in most situations it may be best for citizens simply to be unarmed.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn15" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn15;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[15]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Compare this comment by the Dalai Lama:<o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><span style="color: black;">Every night in my Buddhist practice I give and take. I take in Chinese suspicion. I give back trust and compassion. I take their negative feeling and give them positive feeling. I do that every day. This practice helps tremendously in keeping the emotional level stable and steady. (</span>Reported by <i>Newsweek</i>’s Melinda Liu and Sudip Mazumdar, March 20, 2008)<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn16" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn16;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[16]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> I also desire these things instrumentally, since I also like the consequences I believe they have; for example, cautious driving results in fewer accidents, injuries, fatalities, etc.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn17" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn17;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[17]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> The second part of Marks (2013e) contains many extended examples of what I find advantageous about the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">amoral</i> life. See also the final section of the present book.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn18" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn18;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[18]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> More precisely: Value is inherently subjective, but it does contain objective (or harmlessly objectified) components as well, specifically the unevaluative qualities of the things we value (the honesty we find so virtuous, the arrangement of lines we find so beautiful, etc.) and the psychological attitudes that give rise to our valuations (the desire that everyone be honest, the pleasure at viewing a drawing, etc.).<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn19" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn19;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[19]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Of course I mean “interesting and important” <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">to me</i>, this being in keeping with my subjectivism. However, I sense (or at least hope) they would be found interesting and important by many others as well, which is why I bother to write about them.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn20" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn20;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[20]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Although I will be disagreeing with an interpretation of the wasp’s behavior, the claim about how exactly the wasp does behave can also be questioned. Furthermore, my account of the experiment and its conclusions comes from secondary sources and my own speculations. A folklore has developed around it (actually a number of experiments were conducted over a century), and it is that rather than any actual experiment (or experimenters) which is the target of my critique. See Keijzer <span style="background: white; color: black;">(2013) for more details of the history of the experiment and how it has been appropriated.</span><span style="background: white;"><o:p></o:p></span></div></div><div id="ftn21" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn21;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[21]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> By the way, there is also the possibility that the wasp has good reason to reinspect the burrow on every occasion. Cf. Merow (2013)<span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">.</span><o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn22" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn22;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[22]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Following on the preceding note: Merow (2013) applies this latter point to the wasp (albeit tongue in cheek), attributing reasoning to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">the wasp</i> in the experiment.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn23" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn23;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[23]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Indeed it is so intermittent that I call ours an off-again / off-again relationship.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn24" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn24;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[24]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Cf. “A Moralist Crosses the Street” in Chapter 4.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn25" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn25;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[25]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Also comical from a third-party point of view.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn26" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn26;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[26]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> The objectivist about reason and morals might object that I could not possibly have been <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">reasoning</i> when I decided on such a course of action, since I was obviously in the throes of passion (anger). But this is just the kind of Monday morning quarterbacking I object to in turn. If bad reasoning turns out not to be reasoning at all, then it becomes trivially true that rationality, i.e., good reasoning, will always lead to the right conclusion.<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn27" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn27;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[27]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> This obviously bodes ill for the desirist project, which is based on reasoning. But … hope springs eternal!<o:p></o:p></div></div><div id="ftn28" style="mso-element: footnote;"><div class="MsoFootnoteText"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Joel/Documents/Documents%20CURRENT/WRITING%20by%20me/BOOKS/individual%20BOOKS/DESIRISM%20II/AMORALITY%20fragments/Intrinsic%20Desire%20and%20Morality%20entomology%20insects.docx#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn28;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 10pt;">[28]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></a> Christopher von Bülow (2003) appears to have come to the same conclusion.</div></div></div>jmarkshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18418276248125976522noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1903873475366464.post-7771220071803363942011-07-21T09:02:00.000-04:002011-07-21T09:08:44.203-04:00Veterinarian, Heal Thy Profession!by Joel Marks<br />
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Published in <i>Philosophy Now</i> no. 85 (<a href="http://www.philosophynow.org/issue85/Veterinarian_Heal_Thy_Profession">page 47</a>), July/August 2011.<br />
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A running theme in philosophy is the distinction between appearance and reality. Traditionally this has been given a metaphysical interpretation: The world as we know it is merely phenomenal or illusory. This serves as a justification for philosophy itself, which helps us to discern What Lies Beneath (or Behind or Wherever). While I do not spurn that endeavor, I have also found a more everyday or one might say ethical application of the idea that what we take for granted is not the way things actually are.<br />
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A particularly telling example came to light for me just recently when a veterinarian colleague showed me the Veterinarian’s Oath he took upon entering the profession in the United States. I think if you were to ask a layperson what they think that Oath says, the spontaneous response would be, first, “Do no harm.” This was indeed my thought, so imagine my surprise to discover that neither these words, nor any like them, appear in the Oath. It turns out that the popular conception of the veterinarian as “the animals’ best friend” is as far from the reality as the crowing cocks and contented cows pictured on egg and dairy cartons. This is not to say that many, perhaps most, individual veterinarians are not true animal-lovers. But the profession as such, as represented by both its Oath and clarifying Principles, is not animal-friendly in essence. The Veterinarian’s Oath reads in its entirety as follows:<br />
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“Being admitted to the profession of veterinary medicine, I solemnly swear to use my scientific knowledge and skills for the benefit of society through the protection of animal health and welfare, the prevention and relief of animal suffering, the conservation of animal resources, the promotion of public health, and the advancement of medical knowledge.<br />
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I will practice my profession conscientiously, with dignity, and in keeping with the principles of veterinary medical ethics.<br />
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I accept as a lifelong obligation the continual improvement of my professional knowledge and competence.” (Taken from avma.org)<br />
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Note that priority number one is ‘the benefit of society,’ not the lives and welfare of nonhuman animals. For ‘society’ in this context surely denotes only human animals. The protection of animal health and welfare, the prevention and relief of their suffering, and the conservation of them as ‘resources’ are only means to that end. This suggests what in the law has come to be known as ‘interest convergence,’ which is to say that, as Emory University law professor Ani Satz has pointed out, the welfare of animals is promoted only insofar as it conforms to the ‘benefit’ of human society.<br />
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But, really, an informed and reflective person should not be surprised. First of all, it becomes apparent which is the dog and which the tail when you consider the use of the word ‘resources’ in the Oath. (This was changed from ‘livestock resources’ in 1999.) Secondly the ‘medical knowledge’ that the veterinarian is sworn to ‘advance’ is primarily that which would be of use to ‘society,’ that is again, to human beings. The research to prevent and cure human diseases, relieve human suffering, and lengthen human lifespan often involves the imposition of disease, suffering and premature death on animals in the lab.<br />
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Even more fundamentally, the very notion of a profession puts (human) society first. This is precisely what distinguishes a profession from a ‘mere’ occupation, for the latter involves using a certain sort of skill or training for the purpose of making a living, but the former adds to that a commitment to the society which, in return, assures a comfortable living and various privileges to the professional.<br />
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To put it bluntly, the people who pay the veterinarian are the clients, while the animals, who, indeed, are legally only the property of the humans, are the patients. Thus, the veterinarian’s first commitment is to the human being who owns the animal or, more broadly, to human society (since there are after all individual human beings whose behavior society will not countenance). If any doubt remains, simply consider the very first of the American Veterinary Medical Association’s Principles of Animal Welfare:<br />
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“The responsible use of animals for human purposes, such as companionship, food, fiber, recreation, work, education, exhibition, and research conducted for the benefit of both humans and animals, is consistent with the Veterinarian’s Oath.” (From avma.org)<br />
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Therefore I would like to close with a proposal to the veterinary profession, or actually a set from which to choose:<br />
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1) Strike out a new path for professionalism by making respect and concern for nonhuman animals the first priority of your profession; or<br />
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2) Strive, including by the example of your own dietary and other personal habits, to bring human society around to the point of view that our own ‘benefit’ resides in forswearing the exploitation of nonhuman animals; or<br />
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3) Strive, again by your personal as well as professional example, to bring human society around to the point of view that the relevant ‘society’ or community whose ‘benefit’ is foremost includes all sentient beings.<br />
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If the professional organization of American veterinarians were to alter its credo by putting animals first, and thereby cease to endorse and enable their exploitation for human purposes, the bulk of animal suffering and death at human hands would come to a halt in this country overnight. Isn’t that what the veterinary profession is supposed to be all about?<br />
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Joel Marks is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of New Haven and a Bioethics Center Scholar at Yale University. He commends his website to the attention of all veterinarians: <a href="http://www.toastworks.com/moralmoments/theeasyvegan/home.htm">www.TheEasyVegan.com</a>.jmarkshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18418276248125976522noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1903873475366464.post-78605171292052184772011-07-21T08:52:00.001-04:002011-08-21T09:06:30.948-04:00Review of Larry Carbone's "What Animals Want"by Joel Marks<br />
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Published in <i>Philosophy Now</i> no. 85 (<a href="http://www.philosophynow.org/issue85/What_Animals_Want_by_Larry_Carbone">pages 40-42</a>), July/August 2011<br />
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What do animals want? Larry Carbone, a research laboratory animal veterinarian, makes no bones about it: They don’t want to be there! He writes, “If voluntary consent were our standard for animal research, the whole business would end – not because we cannot understand what the animals are telling us, but because we can” (p.179). How, then, does Carbone justify vivisection, and his own career? In a sense he doesn’t even try. The clue to his motivations, then, is to be found on the very first page of text, in the Acknowledgments:<br />
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“Two people’s illness and death brought pain and sadness to my years of writing. My father, John Carbone, died of Alzheimer’s disease at the start of this project, while my friend Joe DelPonte passed away midway through. They gave me love through the years, while their illnesses taught me that, no, I cannot call for an abolition to animal research, no matter my oath as a veterinarian to relieve animal suffering.” (p.vii)<br />
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What, then, is the purpose of this book? I must admit to having been nonplussed. Actually, I wavered. On the one hand, there is a perfectly straightforward reading of it as a history of progress in providing welfare for lab animals. The author could then be conceived as a cross between Mother Theresa and Saint Francis, facing almost insurmountable odds as he struggles to do the best he can for such animals under their unfortunate circumstances. But on the other hand, the book could be read as a confession by someone who is complicit in all that he describes. Carbone writes, “I have presided over the deaths of thousands of laboratory animals and have seen more pain and suffering than I care to recall, yet I make no call to stop animal experimentation now, only to make it better” (p.239), and again: “I am not writing about whether animals should be in laboratories or whether people have a right to use them in experiments” (p.3). However, he also writes, “No one in my profession can talk about animal research without at least some nod to what I call the ‘big question’: Do we have a right to use animals in research at all?” (p.18)<br />
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The easiest way to understand Carbone’s position is that he defers to, and helps constitute “society’s moral consensus” that “animal research is justifiable and allowable, while simultaneously animal welfare must be protected” (p.57). But in fact he does not consistently apply these ideas, for he writes, “I conclude that we may not have a right to experiment on animals, only a very pressing need” (p.19), and, for example, “That anesthetic drugs might interfere with data interpretation is a scientific explanation [of refraining from their use to alleviate animal pain], but explanation is only synonymous with justification if we grant that all scientific ‘needs’ trump all animal interests” (p.185). This leaves open the possibility that some scientific needs would justify discounting animal interests (or needs), so “the devil is in the details” (p.46). But it is exceedingly difficult to pin Carbone down on which if any needs do justify animal suffering.<br />
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Indeed, Carbone makes the case against the sort of animal research to which he is committed in the most effective terms there could be. Not only is he able to testify as a witness of thirty years’ standing, but he also knows how to skewer the sophistries that have been put forward in its defense. Carbone would do Socrates proud. To give you one of scores of examples: Carbone analyzes the fallacious methodology employed by scientific and veterinary ‘experts’ to back up their recommendations for exercise standards for laboratory animals: “Rather than defend specific claims with their source in the scientific database, these experts line up their witnesses in extensive bibliographies, none of which is cited directly” (p.215). Thus, as Carbone points out, any skeptic would be hard put to refute them without undertaking a daunting task. Yet when Carbone himself attempts to do this scholarly spadework, he finds precious little authoritative support for the supposed experts’ conclusions. Consider also the breathtaking cheat of concluding that cage size does not matter on the basis of experiments that compare an animal’s behavior in small cages of slightly differing sizes, which does not allow the animal any opportunity to show off her clear preference for a much larger one (p.115).<br />
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An Amoral Treatise<br />
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Carbone is fully self-aware as an agent on the job and as an author. He is highly versed in the relevant philosophical, sociological, and historical literatures. One does not often come upon a book which devotes an entire chapter to the guillotining of rodents, but Carbone treats the subject as a case study in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, rhetoric, and more. Another chapter devoted to cage sizes and exercise is at once a story of human comedy and animal tragedy. As a result, reading this book is both an ordeal and a pleasure, for the suffering it reveals and for the competence of its critique respectively. In the end, though, the experience is one of exasperation, since the book makes the reader want to cry out for an end to the practice it delineates, but the book itself does not cry out for an end to the practice. Instead the book advocates the path of painfully won (and lost) reforms that can never keep up with or even catch up with both the enduring and the ever-new horrors in store for these captive animals, while holding out a vague hope for some unspecified future when, due to public opinion or technological breakthrough, it will all be over.<br />
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What I see as the essential nut that this book cannot crack is the moral intuition that, no matter how much prevention of or relief from suffering or premature death is at stake, no one has the right to impose significant suffering or premature death on another who is innocent and non-threatening. No lab animal is causing or threatening harm to any human being, either intentionally or inadvertently. Therefore to remove this being from its natural habitat (not to mention breed it to be ‘unnatural’, and sometimes painfully so) and house it in a cage for the rest of its life; to subject it to distressing and sometimes painful or crippling procedures; and finally to kill it, seems to me to have no viable justification. It’s that stark and simple. Anything else strikes me as hand-waving.<br />
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But I do not accuse Carbone of hand-waving. He tells it like it is, and, far from being the admission of a guilty conscience, this book is more an unapologetic plea for minimizing the harm to other animals in the pursuit of our medical and other worthy goals. But that those goals take precedent over the well-being of the animals is for Carbone not in question. Let me suggest, then, that the only source of confusion for a reader of this book would lie in the assumption that it’s a moral treatise.<br />
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Here’s an analogy. One of my graduate school philosophy professors used to snicker at any mention of the Problem of Evil, which is a notorious argument against the existence of God. Basically it says, “Suffering exists, therefore an all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing God does not exist’. What amused my professor was not any weakness in the argument, but the traditional name of the argument; for the notion that suffering poses a ‘problem’ could only be entertained by somebody who believed in the relevant God. But if you happen not to hold that fantastical belief in the first place, as he would say with outstretched palms and lifted shoulders, “What’s the problem?” There is pain in the world. Why would anyone suppose there wouldn’t be?<br />
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Similarly for the ‘problem’ of vivisection. It is only if one supposed there were a right or wrong about the matter that a justification would need to be sought for it. If instead, vivisection is examined only sociologically or anthropologically, as a human practice, for example, then the only issue is how to account for it, given our natural empathy with the suffering of all living creatures. The explanation, in broad brush, is not difficult to come by: People who engage in or support vivisection are more moved by human suffering than by animal suffering. This does not reduce the latter to zero in their estimation or their feelings, but it definitely reduces its significance in the scheme of things and makes it the loser in a contest between the two. That, I think, dispels any air of mystery that would otherwise attach to this excellent book.<br />
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Ethical Issues<br />
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I admit that this reader’s eyes are not unbiased, since I oppose research on animals in laboratories, and sympathize with Carbone’s lament that “Antivivisectionists have the easy message” (p.73). I remain skeptical of his characterization of the research defender’s message as “more complex and difficult” (ibid). Maybe instead, it is just trying to justify the unjustifiable? But any reader should finally judge the book for themselves. I recommend it in the highest terms. It is exhaustively researched and exquisitely written; and Carbone is eminently suited to write on the topic, having doctorates from Cornell in both veterinary medicine and the history and philosophy of science, as well as his subsequent distinguished career. Nor, certainly, could one find fault with Carbone for a failure to try to improve the lot of laboratory animals: he is a leading spokesman on their behalf. But one sees the same story here as in the farming industry – the pursuit of reform goes hand-in-hand with the expansion of animal exploitation. So while animals in labs are surely better off now than before the contemporary animal liberation movement began in the 1970s, Carbone estimates the number of animals in U.S. labs to have more than quadrupled between 1993 and 2001, and likely to increase. In an analogous way, factory farming, although under ever-mounting pressure from animal activists to reform, has nevertheless increased the eating of flesh worldwide, with no let-up in sight. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that any amount of reform could ever address the essential evils of confinement and premature death in both lab research and factory farming; and in the former, there will always be procedures that involve pain as part of the experimental design – for example, when animals form a control group in the testing of a new analgesic.<br />
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What will it take to reverse this trend? Carbone foresees the end of vivisection, and “would like to live to see that day” (p.239), but he does not appear to see his own role as speeding that result. Instead he is striving to reduce the hurt and harm done by what he takes to be a necessary evil. But if there is not a commitment to ending the evil itself, I for one do not see much hope of that desired outcome. Quite the contrary. Carbone’s book paints an uncompromising picture of the forces at work to maintain the status quo and even turn back some hard-won gains. Whether that is his acuity of mind, or my antivivisectionist reading glasses, or simply the character of a critical book intended to spur reforms, it is what I have taken away from What Animals Want. The bottom line is that, so long as scientific goals are the dog that wags the ethical tail, any procedure whatever, no matter how painful or lethal, can be approved for use in the lab (pp.68 ff and 183). This stance is doubly damning because it is ripe for abuse, and, even when functioning as intended, leaves the animals completely vulnerable to the considered judgments of institutional committees with diverse commitments.<br />
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Carbone’s project in this masterful work is precisely to explode the myth of the “innocent, objective, neutral” experts who preside over the fates of the animals (p.237). His particular thesis is that many different constituencies vie to speak for the animals, but by dint of their special interests, all have doubtful authority to do so – whether they be the scientists who want to experiment on them, the protectionists who want to rescue them, or the veterinarians like himself somewhere in the middle trying to assure the ani mals’ welfare under the existing circumstances. In case study after case study, the book illustrates how contingencies from every corner determine which policies become implemented. Thus, there are occupational biases – the medical professionals who see only physical pain as relevant to animal welfare; turf battles – the lab animal veterinarians who are viewed as intruders by the scientists doing the experiments; political accidents – the Congressman who happens to like dogs; media exposés – the Sports Illustrated story on dog dealers which led to the first federal legislation to protect lab animals, etc. And while all this is going on, the animals themselves, who are the ultimate authority, are largely ignored. But Carbone has already told us what they want: not to be there in the first place.<br />
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• What Animals Want: Expertise and Advocacy in Laboratory Animal Welfare Policy by Larry Carbone. OUP USA, 2004, 304 pps, £22.50 hb, ISBN:978-0195161960.jmarkshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18418276248125976522noreply@blogger.com